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Abstract
This paper proposes work that applies insights from meaning representation systems for
in-depth natural language understanding to representations for self-supervised learning
systems, which show promise in developing complex, deeply-nested symbolic structures
through self-motivated exploration of their environments. The core of the representation
system transforms language inputs into language-free structures that are complex combinations of conceptual primitives, forming a substrate for human-like understanding and
common-sense reasoning. We focus on decomposing representations of expectation, intention, planning, and decision-making which are essential to a self-motivated learner. These
meaning representations may enhance learning by enabling a rich array of mappings between new experiences and structures stored in short-term and long-term memory. We also
argue that learning can be further enhanced when language interaction itself is an integral
part of the environment in which the self-supervised learning agent is embedded.
Keywords: Self-supervised learning; natural language understanding; conceptual primitives; conceptual representations

1. Introduction
Machine learning research has recently shown dramatic improvements in performance on
natural language processing tasks such as machine translation, information retrieval, and
question answering by feeding large corpora of natural language into neural networks. However, work on adversarial examples demonstrates that these systems may only be exploiting
surface-level patterns in training datasets to get high scores on the tests instead of actually understanding language (Jia and Liang, 2017; Zhang et al., 2020). In contrast, this
position paper proposes work that applies insights from meaning representation systems
for in-depth natural language understanding to representations for self-supervised learning systems, which have shown promise in developing complex, deeply-nested symbolic
structures through self-motivated exploration of their environments. The core of the representation system transforms language inputs into language-free structures that are complex
combinations of conceptual primitives, forming a substrate for human-like understanding,
non-linguistic cognition, and common-sense reasoning.
We present preliminary ideas on the enhancement of a theoretical framework for indepth understanding of natural language expressions that describe types of motivational
and anticipatory thinking which are fundamental to self-motivated learning systems. The
theory, Schank’s Conceptual Dependency (CD; Schank, 1972, 1975), decomposes natural
language into complex combinations of simple conceptual primitives representing physical
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and mental acts and events; this representation is designed to confront the problem of linguistic variation—the fact that there are so many ways of expressing the same thing—by
translating language into a non-linguistic conceptual “base”. The conceptual primitive decomposition system has abstract primitives representing intelligent agents’ interactions with
their physical environment, as well as primitives representing memory and cognitive states
that are needed to decompose concepts related to motivation, communication, planning,
anticipatory reasoning, and theory of mind.
To provoke thought on the primitive decomposition of concepts related to prospective
actions and motivation, we construct a number of CD structures that employ a primitive
called MBUILD, which can be used in combination with other CD structures to represent
acts of thinking in their great variety. We present standard relations between each conceptual structure and its English language gloss, and then mechanically generate a number
of paraphrases of the glosses as a way to determine how an automated natural language
understanding system based on the theory would understand the different expressions as
meaning the same thing. We closely examine the paraphrases to determine whether they
make sense and correspond to the spirit of the conceptual structure from which they were
generated, and, when they do not, to see how they suggest ways in which the representation system could be improved for representing the imagery of motivation and anticipatory
thinking.

2. Primitive Decomposition Systems
Primitive decomposition systems (Schank, 1972; Jackendoff, 1983; Wilks and Fass, 1992;
Wierzbicka, 1996) have been employed by cognitive scientists, linguists, and artificial intelligence researchers because they represent canonical forms of meaning and thus reduce
linguistic ambiguity in a variety of research contexts. Among primitive decomposition systems, a particularly compelling kind are those that work to represent a “inner language” of
thought (Winston, 2012a,b) that is different and separate from natural language and represents mental models (Johnson-Laird, 1983) and mental imagery (Sadoski and Paivio, 2001).
Recent work has explored how primitive decomposition systems may be scaled efficiently
through crowdsourcing (Macbeth and Grandic, 2017) and used for knowledge representation (Macbeth, 2017), sentiment analysis (Cambria et al., 2018), and validating the output
of neural perception systems (Gilpin et al., 2018).
Conceptual Dependency (Schank, 1972, 1975) is a primitive decomposition theory that
works to decompose language into complex combinations of the eleven conceptual primitives
shown in Table 1. Figure 1 shows an example of a primitive decomposition of the sentence
“Lisa kicked the ball to the fence” in CD, into a combination of three physical primitive acts,
a MOVE, a PROPEL, and a PTRANS representing Lisa moving her foot toward the ball,
applying a force to the ball, and thus transferring the ball to a new location. The primitive
acts are connected by a double arrow (marked “p” for past tense) to the actor performing
them (Lisa) and they are connected to each other by “instrumental” links to represent that
one act was performed as a part of achieving another. Specifically, the instrumental link
from the PROPEL to the PTRANS represents that the PROPEL act was performed as part
of achieving the PTRANS, while the instrumental link from the MOVE to the PROPEL
represents that the MOVE act was performed as part of achieving the PROPEL.
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CD Physical Primitives
PTRANS To physically transfer an
object from one location to
another. Ex: “go” is a
PTRANS by the actor of
himself.
PROPEL To apply a force to an object.
Ex: “push” is a PROPEL,
“throw” is a PROPEL
through air.
MOVE

GRASP

To move a body part. Ex:
the usual means (instrument)
of PROPELing is MOVEing
one hand.
To grasp an object. Ex:
“hold” and “grab” are
GRASPs. Usually a GRASP
must be ended in order to
“throw.”

INGEST

To ingest an object. Ex:
“drink” is INGEST liquid,
“breathe” is INGEST air.

EXPEL

To force an object from inside
the body to outside the body.
Ex: “spit,” “excrete.”

CD Non-Physical Primitives
ATRANS To transfer possession of an
object from source to
recipient. Ex: “give” is an
ATRANS to someone else,
“take” is an ATRANS to
yourself, “buy” is two
ATRANSes . . .
MTRANS To transfer information
within one person or between
people. Ex: “tell” is an
MTRANS between people.
MBUILD

To create new mental
information from old. Ex:
“decide”, “think about”.

ATTEND To focus a sense organ on a
sensation. Ex: “look at” is
ATTEND eye, “hear” is
ATTEND ear.
SPEAK

To make noise. Ex: “tell” is
an MTRANS by means of
SPEAKing words.

Table 1: The eleven primitives of Conceptual Dependency (CD) divided into groups of
physical and non-physical primitives. Adapted from Schank et al. (1975).

A natural language understanding system that decomposes the meaning into this form
(or a similar one) would be able to map this sentence, or paraphrases of the same idea,
such as “Lisa moved her foot to the ball and hit it to the fence”, onto the same meaning
structure. One major motivation for using primitive decomposition is that it offers depth
of understanding; it provides a substrate for the rich associations between natural language
expressions and a non-linguistic conceptual representation, as well as between the conceptual
representation of natural language and complex knowledge structures for the reasoning
processes that support understanding.

100

Primitive-Decomposed Cognitive Representations

ball
D

Lisa ks

p


+3 MOVE o

o

+3 PROPEL o

o

+3 PTRANS o
O

o

foot

I

Lisa ks



p

ball

I

Lisa ks

p



ball

D

fence
Figure 1: A CD decomposition of the sentence “Lisa kicked the ball to the fence.” CD
(Schank, 1972) decomposes the kicking act into a combination the primitive acts
PTRANS, MOVE, and PROPEL. Double arrows indicate the actor performing
the primitive act. Single arrows marked “o”, “D”, and “I” indicate the object,
the directional case, and the instrument case, respectively. The “p” above the
double arrow represents that the time of the conceptualization is previous to the
time of the utterance.

3. MBUILD Conceptualizations
In addition to six primitives representing physical actions and events, CD has five primitives representing social interaction, perception, and thought. In particular, the MBUILD
primitive represents the mental act in which a person manipulates some number of conceptualizations that are already in memory and creates a new conceptualization. Because of
this, in MBUILD CD diagrams, the objective case to MBUILD is represented with multiple
arrows: several “from” arrows pointing from the existing conceptualizations, and a “to”
arrow pointing toward the conceptualization that was created. A pair of MBUILD CD
conceptualizations are shown in Figure 2.
MBUILD is meant as a representation of natural language surface forms such as “to think
about/of,” “to decide,” and “to consider,” among many others. The conceptualizations that
are manipulated and created by an MBUILD act are also represented in CD1 . The f marking
the double arrow for the MOVE conceptualization created by MBUILD represents that the
MOVE is conceived to happen sometime in the future from the time of the MBUILD act.
This is meant to mean that the MOVE is a decision or plan to perform the act if the actor
of the MBUILD is the same as the actor of the MOVE. More generally, if the actors are not
1. In Schank (1975), the MBUILD conceptualizations all have a “recipient” case indicating the locations
of source and destination conceptualizations in long-term memory and the “conscious processor” (shortterm memory). These have been left out of the diagrams shown here for simplicity.
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“Lisa decided to move her foot towards the ball.”

Figure 2: Two Conceptual Dependency conceptualizations using the MBUILD primitive
with their English glosses. MBUILD represents the act of creating a new conceptualization inside the mind of the actor based on existing conceptualizations.
MBUILD is generally meant to represent surface language forms like “to think
about” and others representing thinking and reasoning. The object case to
MBUILD is represented by multiple arrows marked with an ‘o’: two “from” arrows pointing from the existing “source” conceptualizations (in this case, W and
Z, which are not specified), and a “to” arrow pointing toward the conceptualization that was created. The f marking the double arrow for the MOVE represents
that the MOVE is conceived to happen sometime in the future from the time of
the MBUILD act. In cases when the created conceptualization is in the future,
it represents “to predict” or “to expect” (a), while in cases when the actor of
the MBUILD and the created conceptualization are the same, it represents “to
decide” and similar constructions (b). Adapted from Schank (1975).
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the same, the conceptualization stands for some act or event that the actor of the MBUILD
expects to happen in the future, but that they are not performing themselves.
Figure 2(a) shows an MBUILD act by Lisa in which the product conceptualization is a
MOVE act where Bob is MOVEing his foot towards a ball. In this case the English glosses
are “Lisa expected that Bob would move his foot towards the ball”, or “Lisa thought that
Bob would move his foot towards the ball.” The source conceptualizations are not specified
and are simply given as W and Z. The second diagram, Figure 2(b), shows an MBUILD act
by Lisa in which the product conceptualization is a MOVE act where Lisa is MOVEing her
foot towards a ball. Because the actors of the MBUILD and of the created conceptualization,
MOVE, are the same, it has the English gloss “Lisa decided to move her foot towards the
ball” in CD theory (Schank, 1975).
Figure 3 shows another pair of MBUILD CD conceptualizations. In Figure 3(a), the
MOVE act is given as the source conceptualization, and no conceptualization is given as the
product. This is meant to mean that the actor is performing some conceptual manipulation
based on the sources, but has not yet completed the thinking process to produce any
conceptualization as output. This conceptualization has the English glosses “Lisa considered
moving her foot towards the ball”, and “Lisa thought about moving her foot towards the
ball”.
Finally, in Figure 3(b) the diagram has a section that is identical to that in Figure 2(b);
it is an MBUILD act by Lisa in which the product conceptualization is a MOVE act in the
future where Lisa is MOVEing her foot towards a ball. But it also has another component
representing Lisa MOVEing her foot towards a ball that is not an object of the MBUILD
and is separate from it. This MOVE is connected to the MBUILD via a “result” causal link,
shown as a triple arrow marked “r” between the double arrows of the MOVE and MBUILD.
This link denotes that the MOVE act was caused by the MBUILD, and expresses that Lisa
consciously thought of the act of moving her foot before doing it and that conceptualizing
the MOVE is what caused Lisa to perform it. This conceptualization carries the gloss “Lisa
intentionally moved her foot towards the ball” (Schank et al., 1972)2 .

4. Examining Paraphrases
A close examination of the decomposed conceptual structures and proposed natural language glosses is a frequently used method for determining the suitability of the primitive
decomposition system (see, for example, Schank et al., 1972, and Schank, 1975). By constructing conceptual structures and generating glosses and paraphrases for those structures,
one can determine how well and in what ways the language-free conceptual structures correspond to those that human minds generate when understanding the same texts.
First, we may try using the most general glosses for MBUILD, such as “to think”,
to generate paraphrases. For Figures 2(a) and (b), the paraphrases “Lisa thought that
Bob would move his foot toward the ball” and “Lisa thought that she would move her
foot toward the ball” seem appropriate. For Figure 3(a) we realize that “to think about”
is a more appropriate form than “to think that” to express the processing of the input
2. The decomposition of intentionality and volition-related expressions from Schank et al. (1972) uses a CD
primitive called CONC, “which refers to the primitive act of conceptualization”. CONC does not appear
in later presentations of CD, so we have changed it to an MBUILD to conform with Schank (1975).
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Figure 3: Two more Conceptual Dependency conceptualizations using the MBUILD primitive with their English glosses. When a source conceptualization is specified, it
can be used in constructions involving “to consider”, or “to think about”, as is
the case with the MOVE conceptualization in (a). In (a), the output conceptualization is blank, indicating that none was produced by the MBUILD process. In
(b), the triple arrow marked “r” between the MOVE and MBUILD conceptualizations is a causal link, meaning that the MBUILD caused the MOVE. This kind
of construction is used to represent volitional premeditated acts, expressed in the
gloss in the adverb “intentionally”. Adapted from Schank et al. (1972) and Schank
(1975).
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conceptualization to an MBUILD, and get “Lisa thought about moving her foot towards
the ball”.
Paraphrasing the conceptualization in Figure 3(b), we can represent the causal link with
“to cause” or “because” and form “Lisa moved her foot towards the ball because she thought
that she would move her foot towards the ball”, and “Lisa’s thinking that she would move
her foot towards the ball caused her to move her foot towards the ball.” More briefly, these
could be “Lisa moved her foot towards the ball because she thought she would”, and “Lisa’s
thinking that she would move her foot towards the ball caused her to do it”. We can also
paraphrase Figure 3(b) using “to decide” since the MBUILD part of the conceptualization
matches that in Figure 2(b). This gives us “Lisa moved her foot towards the ball because
she decided to”, and “Lisa’s deciding that she would move her foot towards the ball caused
her to do it.”
Next, we can attempt to apply “to expect”, which is part of the gloss of Figure 2(a)
to other diagrams, since they all have MBUILDs in which the built conceptualization is in
the future with respect to the MBUILD act. This gives us “Lisa expected that she would
move her foot towards the ball”, or perhaps “Lisa expected to move her foot towards the
ball” for Figure 2(b). For Figure 3(b) this gives us “Lisa moved her foot towards the ball
because she expected to”, and “Lisa’s expectation that she would move her foot towards
the ball caused her to do it.”
In examining these paraphrases, the verb “to think” seems to apply well across all of the
CD diagrams we composed, although we needed to be careful about phrasing with “that”
and “about”. Many of the “to expect” sentences seem odd since expectation is usually
associated with events and acts that are not within someone’s direct control. However,
they are still understandable, which may indicate that the decomposition is accurate and
that the weirdness of the paraphrases is only due to conventions in the use of “to expect”
and related verbs.
However, the causal link used in Figure 3(b) to represent intentionality in acts did not
seem to work well when we expressed it linguistically using “because” and “to cause”. It
seems somewhat odd to say that Lisa’s thinking about or deciding that she would move her
foot is what “caused” her to do it. It could be that we have chosen the wrong linguistic
expression of this kind of link in this case. It seems clear that intentionality in an act
involved some kind of conceptualization of the act before performing it, but it may be that
a “causal” link is the wrong kind of link to choose to connect the two acts, or that more
needs to be added to the conceptualization.

5. Conclusion
The preliminary work presented in this paper is focused on enhancing a meaning representation theory for systems that perform in-depth understanding of natural language expressions
of anticipatory thinking. We examined a number of conceptual structures that employ the
CD primitive MBUILD, which is meant to represent acts of thinking in a non-linguistic
conceptual “base”. Future work on the specific thread of exploration presented herein will
examine causal links between MBUILD and other acts to represent volition and intention.
It is also important to consider how surface forms such as the words “goal” and “plan”
map onto this representation. MBUILD allows for input source conceptualizations for rep105
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resenting “to consider” and “to think about”, but clearly the act of planning and the surface
form “to plan” are different and more specific. This exploration suggests that there may be
ways to improve aspects of the CD primitive decomposition system that represent natural
language expressions of expectation, intention, planning, and decision making by expanding, reducing, or modifying the conceptual primitives (e.g. MBUILD) and connectives used
to compose the structures. However, larger more sophisticated “script” structures (Schank
and Abelson, 1977) based on these primitives may also prove to be capable of capturing the
complexity of these concepts.
Another area of future interest is to attempt to map these structures onto belief-desireintention (BDI) models (Bratman, 1987) for intelligent agents. Also, the primitive decomposition uses a time designation to represent things happening in the future, and things in
the future naturally represent expectations and intentions, but this may not always be the
case, since it is possible to conceptualize future events that are not expected or planned—
particularly events that are to be avoided.
More generally, however, we intend to apply insights from these systems to future generations of self-supervised learning systems. Future research in this area focuses on how the
meaning representation may enhance self-supervised learning, and how episodic memories
that self-supervised learning systems encode in the representation form a corpus of knowledge structures that may be a foundation for reasoning. If it is true that learning occurs
on the margins of what an agent already knows, representing knowledge structures in this
primitive-decomposed form will enhance learning by enabling a rich array of mappings between new experiences and structures in short-term and long-term memory. We also argue
that learning can be further enhanced when language interaction itself is embedded in the
environment, for example, via communication with a parent or teacher agent, allowing the
system to form a foundation for in-depth understanding of language by grounding it in the
knowledge structures created in the self-supervised world exploration.
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